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cile permit the action? If not, it is an indication that the state of domicile places its domestic relations policy above the liability for the negligence, and this should be the controlling factor-respect for the law of
the state most intimately concerned with the domesticity of the parties.
Such an approach would also prevent "forum shopping." On the other
hand, if the state of domicile permits the action, then the substantive
question of negligence and liability is determined under the law of
the place where the accident occurred without regard to the capacity
of the spouses to sue in that state.
The ultimate purpose in these actions is generally to collect liability
insurance. In nearly all cases the place of domicile is also the place
of the making of the contract. Aside from the limiting terms of the
contract itself, if the law of the domicile does not permit the primary
tort action and the above suggestion is followed, there will be no judgment to enforce against the insurer. Under the center of gravity approach, since insurance contracts are required to comply with the laws
of the state where made (which is usually the place of domicile), again
the major factor is domicile and not the law of the lex loci delicti.
By utilizing either the lex domicilii or the center of gravity approach, the Stecker case was correctly decided. The ultimate interpretation of its own statute falls upon the State of New York. To apply the
substantive law of Connecticut to a New York insurance contract would
be to disregard what earlier New York cases determined to be the
purpose of the legislature in making the 1937 change in the state's
insurance law-i.e., to prevent collusion. The element of collusion
is equally present whether the accident occurred in New York or outside its boundaries.
WILLIAM

0.

ROBERTS, JR.

A DOUBLE JEOPARDY DILEMMA IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
As a general rule a person is first put in jeopardy when he has been
placed on trial under a valid indictment before a court of competent
jurisdiction, has been arraigned and has pleaded, and a proper jury
has been impanelled and sworn to hear the evidence.1 After jeopardy
1
For example, "If, without a trial, the court quashes a valid indictment, or
enters judgment for the defendant on his demurrer, believing it invalid, a trial
may be had after the prosecutor has procured the reversal of these proceedings;
because... the prisoner is not in jeopardy until the jury is impanelled and sworn."
i Bishop, Criminal Law § 1027 (9th ed. 1923). See also Cornero v. United States,
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has thus attached, a second prosecution will be barred upon entry of
a nolle prosequi without the consent of the accused,2 upon dismissal
of a valid indictment, 3 or upon discharge of the jury without the con4
sent of the accused.
Even when jeopardy has attached, it is well established that the
defendant may, by his own conduct, waive his defense of former
jeopardy. 5 Consequently, a second prosecution for the same offense will
be valid after an arrest of judgment on motion of the defendant,6 after
the granting of a new trial to the defendant by the trial court or the
appellate court,7 or after the discharge of the jury with the defendant's
consent.3 The scope of the waiver doctrine presents difficulties, however, when the defendant is convicted of a lesser offense than the crime
charged in the indictment or information. For instance, when the jury
returns a verdict of second degree murder upon a murder indictment,
and on the defendant's motion a new trial is later granted, may the
defendant then be convicted of first degree murder?
This question was recently decided by the United States Supreme
48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.

1931);

United States v. Van Vliet, 23 Fed. 35 (E.D. Mich. 1885);

Note, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 522, 527 (1940).

Jeopardy attaches in a case without a jury when the accused "has been indicted and arraigned, has pleaded and the court has begun to hear evidence." McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.ad 640, 642 (0oth Cir. 1936).
-Clawans v. Rives, 104 F.2d 240, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1939).

3Nolan v. United States, 163 F.2d 768, 770 (8th Cir. 1947); Wolkoff v. United
States, 84 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1936).
'Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688 (1949); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100,
128 (19o4). In general see American Law Institute, Administraton of the Criminal
Law: Double Jeopardy 61-72 (1935). The rule is subject to exception in those cases
where "unforeseeable circumstances ... arise during a trial making its completion
impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict." 336 U.S. at 689. See
also Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916); Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135
(i9o9); Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894); Logan v. United States, 144
U.S. 263 (1892); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
rSee 1 Bishop, Criminal Law § 998 (9th ed. 1923); Miller, Criminal Law § i86(e)
('934).
OColeman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1878); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163
(1873); Pratt v. United States, 102 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 193g). Bishop states that
"whenever ... the defendant for any cause moves in arrest of judgment or applies
to the court to vacate a judgment already entered ... he will be presumed to waive
any objection to being put a second time in jeopardy....1" Bishop, Criminal Law
§ 998, at 740 (9th ed. 1923).

'United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896); Miller v. United States, 224 F.2d
561, 562 ( 5 th Cir. 955).
"See Miller, Criminal Law § 186(e), (g) (1934). For additional examples of when
jeopardy does not attach see I Wharton, Criminal Law § 397 (izth ed. 1932). In
considering the waiver doctrine, it is not to be assumed that the defendant would
waive his defense of former jeopardy by appealing an acquittal. See Note, 24 Minn.
L. Rev. 522, 534, n. 77 (1940).
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Court in Green v. United States.9 The accused, on trial for arson and
first degree murder in the District of Columbia, was properly convicted
of arson, but, because of an improper instruction by the trial judge,
he was erroneously convicted of second degree murder.10 On appeal, the
second degree murder conviction was reversed and the case remanded
for a new trial on the ground that the evidence could only sustain a conviction of first degree murder.1" Upon a second trial for first degree
murder, the defendant's plea of former jeopardy was rejected and a
new jury found him guilty of first degree murder.12 This second conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.13 After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four
decision, reversed the first degree murder conviction of the second trial
on the ground that it violated the double jeopardy provision of the
4
Federal Constitution.'
In writing the majority opinion, Justice Black recognized that the
Supreme Court, in United States v. Ball,' 5 had embraced the principle
55 U.S. 184 (1957).

1
The court of appeals determined that it was error to instruct on second degree murder because "all the testimony as to what occurred in the burning house
pointed to murder in the first degree and nothing else." Green v. United States,
218 F.2d 856, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
uSee note io supra.
32D.C. Code Ann. § 22-2404 (1951) provides that the punishment of murder in
the first degree shall be death by electrocution, and that punishment of murder
in the second degree shall be imprisonment for life, or for not less than 20 years.
"Green v. United States, 236 F.2d 708, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1956), noted in 14 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 228 (1957) and 66 Yale L.J. 592 (1957). Three judges dissented on the
ground that the conviction of second degree murder at the first trial constituted an
acquittal of first degree murder. Id. at 718.
By affirming the greater conviction, however, the majority of the court of
appeals was consistent with its warning to the defendant when he appealed the
lesser conviction: "In seeking a new trial at which-if the evidence is substantially
as before-the jury will have no choice except to find him guilty of first degree
murder or to acquit him, Green is manifestly taking a desperate chance. He may
suffer the death penalty. At oral argument we inquired of his counsel whether
Green clearly understood the possible consequence of success on this appeal, and
were told the appellant, who is 64 years of age, says he prefers death to spending
the rest of his life in prison. He is entitled to a new trial." Green v. United States,
218 F.-d 856, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
"1[NJor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. The phrase "life or limb" has not
been construed strictly; it is held to apply to any criminal penalty. Ex parte Lange,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
Double jeopardy provisions are embodied in the constitutions of most of the
states. See Kneier, Prosecution Under State Law and Municipal Ordinance as Double
Jeopardy, 6 Corn. L.Q. 201, 2o02, n. 4 (1931). The present comment is directed
mainly to a consideration of a current double jeopardy dilemma in the federal
courts. See Note, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 522 (194o), for an excellent discussion of double
jeopardy in general.
5163 U.S. 662 (1896).
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that a defendant may be tried a second time for the same offense when
his prior conviction for that offense has been set aside on his own appeal.' 6 Green, however, presented a different problem. There was no
original first degree murder conviction upon which to base a second conviction following an appeal. Instead, at the first trial there was an "implied acquittal" of first degree murder. It was as "if the jury had returned a verdict which expressly read: 'We find the defendant not guilty
of murder in the first degree but guilty of murder in the second degree.' "17 Thus, continued Justice Black, it could not be presumed that
the defendant would voluntarily place himself in peril of being convicted of first degree murder when he had already been acquitted of that
offense. The concept of waiver connotes a voluntary and knowing relinquishment of a right, and, when a defendant has been convicted of a
lesser offense, "it is wholly fictional to say that he 'chooses' to forego his
constitutional defense of former jeopardy on a charge of murder in the
first degree in order to secure a reversal of an erroneous conviction of
the lesser offense."' s In short, the majority opinion reflects the view
that the retrial be limited to those issues brought into dispute by the
appeal. 19
It must be borne in mind that the waiver doctrine 20 is an exception
to the well-settled rule that jeopardy attaches upon the swearing and
impanelling of a jury.21 As explained before, if there has been a dismissal of a valid indictment after the jury has been impanelled and
sworn to hear the evidence, a second prosecution for the same offense
will be barred. 22 Strictly, then, in any situation where jeopardy has
properly attached, the defendant should be entitled to the benefit of an
appeal without the hazard of a new trial for the same offense if the
'6The double jeopardy clause has been interpreted as prohibiting a right of
appeal by the government in the federal courts. See Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 83,
344-45 (1955); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 67, (1896). Cf. Kepner v. United
States, 195 U.S. oo (19o4); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312 (1892). Comley,
Former Jeopardy, 35 Yale L.J. 674, 678 (1926), criticizes the application of the double
jeopardy doctrine to prevent appeals by the state.
17355 U.S. at 191.
1
61d. at 192.
"In explaining the majority opinion, Justice Black declared that "Green was
not convicted of first degree murder and that offense was not involved in his appeal.
If Green had only appealed his conviction of arson and that conviction had been
set aside surely no one would claim that he could have been tried a second time
for first degree murder by reasoning that his initial jeopardy on that charge continued until every offense alleged in the indictment had been finally adjudicated."
Id. at 193.
mOSee note 5 supra.
=See note i supra and accompanying text.
=See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
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conviction is reversed. Nevertheless, such a literal interpretation of the
jeopardy clause has not been adopted in the federal courts, and consequently, Justice Black's recognition of the soundness of Ball, which
permits a retrial for the same offense after a conviction has been reversed on appeal, seemingly implies the necessity for something less
than a literal interpretation of the double jeopardy provision of the
Federal Constitution. The rationale of Ball, to circumvent a literal
construction of former jeopardy, is based upon one of two theories: that
the defendant "waives" his plea of former jeopardy by asking that a
conviction be set aside; 23 or, that the second trial is but a continuing
jeopardy that attached at the first trial.24 According to Justice Black,
neither of these theories is applicable to the greater offense in Green
because the jury was "authorized" to find the accused guilty of either
first or second degree murder. 25 The fact remains, however, that the
jury was "authorized" to return a verdict of second degree murder
only because the trial court erred by instructing on the lesser crime."
[A]ll the testimony as to what occurred in the burning house pointed to
murder in the first degree and nothing else." 2 6 It is logical to assume
that had there not been the erroneous instruction on second degree
murder, the jury would have returned a verdict of first degree murder in
preference to a complete acquittal. Moreover, if such a conviction had
been reversed on the defendant's motion, a second trial for first degree
murder would have been valid under the principle established in Ball.
It follows, therefore, that the right to a retrial for the so-called "greater
offense" is actually not a right to retry the accused for a greater offense
at all; rather, there should be a right of retrial for the only offense
charged since first degree murder was the basis of the government's
case, and it alone was sustained by the evidence. It must be remembered that the word "greater," under any context, is a relative term.
In cases like Green it is imperative that a true legal relation exist between separate offenses rather than a colorable relation caused by
a procedural error. Thus, when the defendant obtains a reversal, the
right of the government to retry the defendant for first degree murder
r'Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 533 (19o5); Brewster v. Swope, 18o F.2d
984, 986 (9th Cir. 1950). Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
2t
Justice Holmes refused to recognize the waiver doctrine but permitted a retrial on the basis that jeopardy did not come to an end until the accused was acquitted or his conviction became final. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 135
(19o4) (dissenting opinion). Under the Holmes view, however, the government could
appeal an acquittal-a theory which has been consistently rejected by the Supreme
Court. See note 16 supra.
'355 U.S. at 189.
2Green v. United States, 218 F.2d 856, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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is nothing more than the application of a principle already recognized
27
in Ball.
The majority opinion asserts that the conviction of the lesser offense
is to be interpreted as an "implied acquittal" of the greater. On the
contrary, the conviction of the lesser offense appears to be an excellent
example of jury leniency as a consequence of the jury's having been
given an opportunity to convict for a lesser crime due to an error by
the trial judge. When the jury found the defendant guilty of arson at
the first trial, this verdict necessarily included the finding that death
resulted from the commission of arson.28 Therefore, the only possible
verdict relative to the homicide would have been murder in the first
degree, which, under the felony murder statute of the District of Columbia, merely requires a finding of guilty as to arson when a homicide
results therefrom.2 9 Consequently, the conviction of the lesser offense
can be interpreted as nothing other than a compromise verdict, or,
more simply, a good illustration of jury recognition of the criminal
character of the defendant's conduct without applying the facts to the
law. As Justice Frankfurter, writing the minority opinion in Green,
aptly observed: "Surely the silence of the jury is not, contrary to the
Court's suggestion, to be interpreted as an express finding that the
defendant is not guilty of the greater offense. All that can with confidence be said is that the jury was in fact silent. Every trial lawyer and
every trial judge knows that jury verdicts are not logical products, and
are due to considerations that preclude accurate guessing or logical
deduction. Insofar as state cases speak of the jury's silence as an
'acquittal,' they give a fictional description of a legal result....,30
Furthermore, if the verdict of guilty of second degree murder is to
be interpreted as an "implied acquittal" of the crime of the first degree
murder, and if the verdict from which the inference is drawn is set
aside upon the defendant's motion, nothing remains from which such
-0'It is necessary to re-emphasize the fact that the defendant appealed the lesser
conviction. If the defendant had elected not to appeal, then there could have been
no retrial for first degree murder for the same reason that the government may not
appeal an acquittal. "The verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed,
on error or otherwise, without putting him [the defendant] twice in jeopardy,
and thereby violating the Constitution." United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671
(1896). See note 6 supra.
nThe undisputed testimony "shows beyond peradventure that Bettie Brown's
death was caused by the fire in the house in which her body was found." Green v.
United States, 218 F.2d 856, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
"-'Whoever... without purpose so to do kills another in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate any arson ...is guilty of murder in the first degree." D.C.
Code Ann. § 22-2401 (1951).
3355 US. at 214 (dissenting opinion).
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an acquittal can be inferred. The verdict and its implications must fall
together. Similar reasoning was expressed in the 19o5 case of Trono v.
United States,3 ' which Green, in effect, overruled. In that case the defendants were prosecuted for murder in the first degree. They were
acquitted of the crime of murder and convicted of the lesser included
crime of assault. They appealed to the Supreme Court of the Philippines, and that court, operating under local procedure which permitted a review of both law and facts, reversed the judgment of the lower
court and entered a conviction of murder in the second degree. Upon
review by the United States Supreme Court, Justice Peckham regarded
the question as though it had arisen in one of the federal courts, with
the result that the opinion would be an interpretation of the double
jeopardy provision of the Federal Constitution rather than an interpretation of local Philippine law.3 2 The Court concluded that "the reversal of the judgment of conviction opens up the whole controversy,
and acts upon the original judgment as if it had never been." 33 In
other words, Trono represents the theory that the verdict of conviction
is a "single entity," that a new trial necessarily reopens the whole proceeding, and that the defendant cannot stand on that part of the verdict
which is beneficial to him and repudiate that which affects him ad34
versely.
The futility of favoring either the "single entity" theory or the "implied acquittal" theory becomes obvious upon the realization that
neither provides a workable solution to the principal case. The basic
premise to be remembered in all federal courts in which there has been
a conviction of a lesser offense under an indictment charging a greater
offense is that a verdict operates in a dual capacity while it stands unreversed; it is a conviction of the lesser offense, and it is a bar to a
prosecution for the greater offense. 35 Beyond this, when the defendant
1199 U.S. 521 (i9o5). In the words of the Court in Trono: "When at his own
request he [defendant] has obtained a new trial he must take the burden with the
benefit, and go back for a new trial on the whole case." Id. at 534.
"'We may regard the question as thus presented as the same as if it arose in
one of the Federal courts in this country...." Id. at 53o. In spite of this statement, Justice Black declared in the principal case: "We do not believe that Trono
should be extended beyond its peculiar factual setting to control the present case.
All that was before the court in Trono was a statutory provision against double
jeopardy pertaining to the Philippine Islands-a territory just recently conquered
with long-established legal procedures that were alien to the common law." 355
U.S. at 197. Note, however, that Justice Black was very careful not to expressly
overrule Trono.
"Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 533 (1905).
"See Note, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 522, 536 (1940).
-1See Trono v. United States, 199 U-. 521, 533 (19o5), where the Court stated:
"As the judgment stands before he appeals, it is a complete bar to any further
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obtains a reversal of the lesser conviction and a new trial is granted,
Green asserts absolutely that the defendant can never be tried again for
the greater offense, and Trono asserts absolutely that the defendant can
always be tried again for the greater offense. The unfortunate fact remains that neither approach is practical. The history of Green reveals
that the conviction of second degree murder at the first trial was set
aside as being contrary to the evidence. The retrial resulted in a conviction of first degree murder, which the Supreme Court set aside as
being a violation of double jeopardy. Consequently, the second reversal is tantamount to a complete bar to any further murder prosecution.30 It would appear that the argument in favor of adopting Trono
exists if for no other reason than to protect the interests of society from
the present danger of unwarranted 7 appeals which revert murderers
38
to the status of free men.
Suppose, however, that the record of the principal case revealed that
at the first trial there was a disputed question of fact concerning
whether or not the deceased died as a result of the defendant's misconduct before the arson was committed or as a result of the arson.
Suppose further that the jury resolved the fact that death occurred
from some prior misconduct of the accused before the arson. Having
prosecution for the offense set forth in the indictment, or of any lesser degree thereof." See also note 27 supra.
"Oliver Gasch, the United States Attorney whose office prosecuted the Green
case, in response to an inquiry from the writer said: "In answer to your letter...
you are advised that this office is unable to prosecute Green for either the crime
of murder in the first degree or in the second degree. This office does not contemplate taking any further action so far as criminal prosecution is concerned in this
case." Letter from Oliver Gasch, United States Attorney, Feb. 28, 1958, on file in
the office of the Washington and Lee Law Review.
'wSince the accused preferred death to spending the rest of his life in prison,
counsel for the defense gambled on the outcome of the principal case. See note 13
supra.
nS.n arguing for the adoption of the Trono rule, the Supreme Court of Nevada
fervently contended: "There are many cases where a cold-blooded murderer,
through the eloquence of his attorney, or sympathy for his relatives or those dependent upon him, or where a majority of a jury, believing the defendant guilty
of murder in the first degree, in order to appease some member of the jury, or for
other reasons, rather than to allow the accused to escape some punishment, or prevent a mistrial or total miscarriage of justice, agree to bring in a verdict of a lower
degree of homicide, when, as a matter of right and justice, the defendant, if he got
his just deserts, should be hanged by the neck until he be dead. The people of the
state, representing the victim of the accused, on a new trial, if they can prove a
clear and conclusive case of murder in the first degree, ought to be entitled to
exact the full penalty of the law with equally as good a right as the defendant has
to receive only the punishment provided by law for the lesser degree of crime, and
to hold otherwise, we believe, would be a travesty of justice." Gibson v. Somers, 31
Nev. 531, 1o3 Pac. 1073, 1074 (1909).
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thus eliminated the felony murder theory of the prosecution, a conviction for the lesser included offense of second degree murder would
be justified. 39 Upon a subsequent reversal for some other error, such as
misconduct of the jury, Trono would nevertheless permit a retrial for
first degree murder because the first conviction is treated as if it never
existed. In this instance, a second trial for first degree murder would
appear to be a true violation of double jeopardy since a legitimate
question of fact relating to the time of death had already been decided.
It is suggested that the approach of Palko v. Connecticut4 Oshould be
adopted in the federal courts'. This decision upheld the constitutionality of a state statute4 ' which permitted the prosecution to appeal a
conviction of second degree murder and on retrial to secure a conviction of first degree murder. In upholding the statute as not being
42
in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
the Court placed great emphasis on the state's interest in obtaining
a trial "free from the corrosion of substantial legal error."43 Furthermore, since the statute did not permit successive trials of a defendant
validly acquitted of a crime, there was found to be no unreasonable
deprivation of any fundamental right of the accused.4 4 Notwithstanding
'*For an excellent illustration of when the evidence warrants a second degree
murder conviction under a prosecution for murder in the first degree, see Kitchen
v. United States, 221 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1955), where a conviction of second degree
murder was upheld under an indictment charging the defendant with killing the
deceased during robbery. The evidence was such as to warrant the jury in finding
that the defendant killed the victim but that he did not rob or attempt to rob
him.
'0302 U.S. 319 (1937)"Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8878 (1949).
"U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § i: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." An important factor in determining whether a state statute meets the requirements of due process of law is
the status of the right at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. At common
law a convicted person could not obtain a new trial by appeal except in certain
narrow instances. See i Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, c. io
(1883). The law has since evolved to the point where Palko permits a mutual right
of appeal under state statute.
The common law rule prohibiting appeals should also be considered when interpreting the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment as applicable to
the federal courts. The argument that the protection against double jeopardy was
never intended to apply when the defendant appealed any conviction appears to be
sound. The Court stated in Trono that "the constitutional provision was really
never intended to, and, properly construed, does not, cover [sic] the case of a judgment under these circumstances, which has been annulled by the court at the request of the accused .... " Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 534 (1905).
"3Palko v. Connecticut, 3o2 U.S. 319, 328 (1937)- See 355 U.S. at 215-16 (dissenting
opinion).
"In 19o4, Justice Holmes, in advocating a right of the government to appeal,
made a statement which is particularly significant when read in the light of the

